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1. lNTI\ODLTCTIOI\: 
More th.:u1 seven ye<�rs after the attacks of 9/11, it is perhaps 
difficult to remember the terrible confusion of the inunediate 
aftermath. As l sit dovvn to write this Article in a Pentagon office 
damaged by Americcm ALrlines Glight 77, I can only imagine how 
1nuch these softly humming computers, neatly organized binders, 
and modu Jar walls bclje lhe horrible reaLity of that fall morning. • u 
According to a former Deputy Attorney General of the Office of 
Legal Counsel ("OLC"), the document that legally "set the tone for 
all that was to come" in the so-called Wm· on Terror was penned 
am.idst tl1at catastrophic contusion, a were two weeks after the 
attacks.l While "burdened wi.th dozens of other emergency 
duties," a prominent acc�demic who possessed an expansive view 
of prcsidl'ntial power quickly dr,1fted an OLC memo entitled, "The 
President's Constitution,•! Authority to Condllcl Militnry 
· Micb,wl 6Clhflr is ,1 l.i�uten.mt in tilt' U.S. Navy jlllige Advocatt> Gener.1!'::. 
("JAG") C>r�1 MKI an ,1djunct pr(1fcs�or ill NYU's \Vilf Fe1mily Department of 
Politics. He h<1s Jn LL.M, from G1lumbi<1 University School of Law, a J.D. from 
f L:lrvard Law School, and <111 M.PhU in lnkrnJtional Relations from Cambrid�co 
Universitv. H� h<�� been on ,Ktive dutv since June :2003. He would like to tha1;k 
1-l;otm,lh J�obens illld his i,unih·, as IVc
.
ll J:S Patrie"- M. Walsh, Bruce Mo:JcDun.dd, 
Ji'lm·=� w Hnth,:k, f;'rln r: Sinn� ;md r'\nrwtto• r•igntt. ThP viPWS expreso:;ed in lhi� 
Paper ,ue tlw Autl·wr'<. own. They du not necess.uily r�present the view<.; uf the 
Deparlment (1f [k•fc:nsc, the united SlCltcs t'-:,wy, or MtV of its components. 
' ]ALl< GoLD<:.;-..Im 1. THE !"ERROR PRES!DF'-fC1: LAW Ai'-:D juoc:-.IE�T li'-:SIDI:. rHE 
BusH AOivllt\IS'l !\.-\ 110� tl7-98 (2007). 
1295 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1296 U. ?11. /. luf'l L. I Vol. 30:4 
Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them."2 
Th.is memo, coupled with his ideological alignment with those in 
the Administrcllion devoted to � strong or u nitary executive, 
suddenly gained hirn entry into the exclusive and highly 
influential War Council. Together with the ·white House Counsel, 
the Vice President's Cou nsel, and the General Counsel of the 
Department of Defense, he plotted the legal str�tcgy in the war o n  
terrorism, drafting'' opinion and opinion Clppro\'ing every aspect o f  
the administre1tion's aggressive antiterrorism efforts.''3 
But these memos, drafted in extraordin0ry limes and under 
great pressure, proved significantly flawed as emergency ceded to 
the nev·l normalcy of the post-9 /11 world. While some of these key 
memos have been revised, and many have been completely 
withdrawn,-1 some of the basic views on the legal status o f  terrorists 
and other non-state <1ctors persist, causing great legal confusion. 
In truth, the legal theories the War Council espoused to 
maximize presidential power actually concealed many potent 
avenues of executive authority. By regaining cbrity, however, 
these powers can be revealed- and the key to doing so lies in 
understanding the crucic1l role of the state i n  the international 
context. As the United States takes on the violent non-state actors, 
whose arsenals now exceed those of many states, policymakers 
and leaders should not give Ltp on those "old-fashioned" rules 
designed for relations among states. Many of the legal constructs 
developed over the past centuries, when properly clarified, are still 
very powerful tools for defending national security, even within 
what has been lE:'rmed the Fonrlh Generation of warfare.s 
International law and constrtutional law empower, not hamper, the 
nation's efforts to defend itself and its allies, just as they have 
always done. 
ld. 
' /d. HI 23. 
� Men1orandurn tron1 S'tcven G, Br�dbury,. Princ-ip;d Deputy ,�ssistant 
Attorney Ccner:al, Stolu� 11( (L'rfa!l OLC Opi11it111:5 J.:;;;ucrl i11 1/Je A}il!l'llmtlt (if 1/Jc 
Tarorist 1\tln<'ks uf S�J11. l1, 2UO 1 (J<�n. ·15, 2009), tn>nila/lle at 
hltp:/ / www.usdoj.gov / npa/ documents/ memostalusolcopinionsO L 152009.pdf 
(rescinding many memorandums issued in the wake ot the 9/11 attacks). 
5 Set! genaally COlONEL THot-·IAS X;\ VIER HAMMES, THE SuNG AND THE STONE: 
ON WAR IN THE 21'5'1 CENTURY (2004) (discussing the evolved nature and 
characteristics of Fourth Generation warfare). 
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In a companion article, I argued that \•Ve cannot vvage wm 
against non-state actors, no rnatter lhow virulent tht=>y n•ay be6 
"War" and "the enemy" connote definitive legal categories from 
the framing of the Constitution to the present which, if expa nded 
beyond their original state-based undt:!rstanding, S\lvallow essential 
pillars of the remaining constitutional structure, render much of 
the existing law of war inconsistent, and make military objectives 
more strategically difficult to attain.' However, in a brief note, I 
argued that we can nonetheless use military force to co u nter these 
violent non-state actors-and, at times, shou ld.t: 
ln this Article, I expand upon that note and attempt to clarify 
and frame the most important legal :issues affecting the planning 
and execution of operations against nonsta te actors in the coming 
decades. This Article should dernonstrate that while we cannot 
wage war against non-state acto rs, the U.S. Constitution and 
international law, when properly clarified, vigorously support 
forcefully engaging non-state actors vvho: (a) take a direct part in 
hostilities; (b) commit violent attacks outside the jurisdiction of any 
state; or (c) engage in action sufficiently hostile to warrant 
intmediate measures in individual or unit self-defense. 
While individual articles can expound on each of these points 
in great detail, this Article seeks instead to provide the overarching 
international and constitutional framework, and to make the point 
that embracing the law, instead of fighting against it, reveals the 
law's true power. Force will not solve many of the great security 
challenges on its own- for national security must be a national 
exertion, as international security must be a global one- but, there 
is great cause to hope that in the next decades, a renewed embrace 
of the international and constitutiona1 law of war will fully reveal 
the empowering abilities of both and the law's ability to enhance 
the security of all. 
2. CROSSING BO.RDERS: THE [US AD BHLWvi .REQUIREMENTS 
Over the past eight years, trying to argue that war cannot be 
legally vvaged against non-state actors consistently met with fierce 
1> Sec Michael Bahar, As Necessity Crcntc� t/1<· Rule: Eisentrager, Boumedienc 
1111d Tile Enc111y- Haw Stmtcgic Rcnlitics Clll Ctl11Siitutiolit7lly Require Grcnfer Rig/its 
far Octninces in ilu: Wars of the TzPcnty-Fir�t Ce11111ry, '11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 277 
(2009). 
7 /d. Cit 209-303. 
s ld. Cit 301. 
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resistance in certain defense and natiomd sec uritv circles. To those 
vvho believe lhat war can be declared against non-state actors/1 I 
would a5;k: Since the 9/11 hijackers plc1nncd their atte1cks in 
Germany, vvnuld it be legal for the Unil�d States to 'ivage vvar 
against t.h0m b\'1 say, launching cruise missiles ,,gJinst rem Z� ining 
a! Q<1cda terrorist cells in Hamburg without Germcm consent or 
without evidence that Germany harbored or supportL�d the 
hijackers?' 
Put anlotb�r \Nay: going after those dangerous individuals is 
one thing;, but since warfare involves kinetic strike�, �H1d Lhc U.N. 
Charter prohibits the nonconscnsual use <.."f force c1gainst (or 
within) another ::.late except in self-defense, would it be legal for 
the United States to invade any cmmtn· in which " suspected 
terrorist resides, even if the state itself vvas cluing everything i L 
could to thwurt tenorism? 
To those who answer that it would, in fact, be legnl, I vvnuld 
ask: but would it be legal for the German::;; to l.:nmch a cruise 
missile irnto Miami if they had actionable intelligence that e� 
terrorist wos plotting an attack against Gennany in the middle 
floor of a high-rise, waterfront condominium? 
For the thoughtful, the response often is: well, there !llliSt be C\ 
wc:1y for the United Slates to defend itself militarily. And there is. 
But oiten the ideological and the intransigent cut off the d_iscussion 
with their respo.nse: 11WelL let 'em try." 
Unfortunately, such a brawny response just shijts the question 
from the legal to the power-political. But as Lhe past eight yeors 
have shown, those who pounded the neoconservative table and 
sought to declare "law and force as antonyms"11i are painfully 
wrong.11 Hopefully the next years will demonstrate that law and 
'1 See e.g. iV!l!morandum from John C. You, Dq'Llt)' /\ssisl<�nt 
Attornev Ceneral, to Alberto Gonzales, Counsel to the President, 2--1 
(Oct. 1\ 200'1.), uuailnNi! at http:// W\v\\·.u�duj.guv / upn/ document:, 
/ lllt!m<1mil ti t<�r:' forcccomba tus10232001. pdf. 
Ill Sec, J'.g,, STEPIIEi\: llOLivlt:S, rffE M.-\TAnor(:. C..\i'F: .•\;>.1U\IC..\1S RFli-:LES� 
RESPONSE r<.l TEI-!I\01< 76 (2007). 
n NO\vhcre is the shift CIWCI)' frn111 this view ,1nd l�>w :mb iht? str:1ll!gic 
,1lignnwnl of I<11V <�nd force more pmnounced th.111 In tlw L·.s. Anny/M<Irine.:; 
Counlerinsurgt>ncy Field M<1nual, publishl'd in Dcc.:mber 1006 by General D,wid 
Petraeus and hi:; Marine counterpart, Lieutenant Generr1l J<�mcs Amos. The Field 
�'l,lnual marked a radical shiit in policy in lmq, ,1nd C�fficially notctl the 
deleterious strategic effects of "illegitimate actions . .. involving the use of power 
witbout authority," including "unlawful detention, torture, nr punishment 
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force are strategically aligned, especial ly in Fourth Generation 
\varf<lre. 
The vv<:1y the United States can defend itself milit21rily from non­
state actors residing in another state- holding aside Security 
Council cnforcernent action under Chapter VII or obtaining 
diplomatic consent- is through the inherent right of individual or 
co llective self-defense against state complicity or <l fundan1.entc1l 
st<lte ! nabilitv to keeo its house in order. ' l 
1.1. Artide 51n11Ll Stnte Complicity 
To build this grealer clarily over the coming years, 
international lcnvvers, as well as constitutional lawvers, J -
polic�'makers, and judges, must accept the following fact: the 
proscription on the threat or use of force,t2 bi nding on the United 
Stotes as a ratified treaty,D has 21s its primary excep tion the right of 
self-defense,14 \vh.ich only applies, and cnn only apply, to armed 
�1ttacks by other states or their equivalent. 
Of course, the p lain language of Article 51 to the U.N. Charter 
does not expressly limit self-defense to responses to armed attack 
by states.15 Adm i ttedly , while Article 2(4) explicitly states that oll 
members "shall refrain .in their international relations from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state,"16 Article 51 has no such textual 
!imitC1tion on the source of the armed 21ttackY In fact, tl1e language 
without trial." U.S. ARi\IY-:\IL\RiNE CORPS, FIF.LD MANU:\L, -12-43, 
O ..IV\Tm r ,:s u RG EN C Y, ,i 1-132 (University of Chicago Press 2006). 
�� C.\J. Charter art. 2, para. -1 ("All members shall rdr<1in in their 
intern<�tional rel<1tions from the thre<�t or use of force against the territorial 
intcgrit�· or political independence of any state, or in any other m<wtner 
inconsist�nt with the Purposes of the United Nations."). 
u Sec t...:.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (provid ing that treaties are the supn�rnc law of 
the land}. 
:.J tJ.N. Charter art. 51. 
I' Sec Andru [. Wi:lll, lntcmtllic.)IJn/ Law and tl1e Bus/1 Ooctri11<!, 34 ]SR. Y.B. HU:>.·I. 
lhs. 193, 202 (2004). 
J, U.i\!. Charter, art. 2, p<'lra. -1 (emphasis added). 
17 /d. Mt. 51 (emphasis added). S<!c alsu Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 
200-l !.C.J. 136, 215 (Jul)' 9) (separate opinion of Judge Higgins) ("There is, with 
respect, nothing in the text of Article 51 that tlws stipulates that self-defence is 
available only when an armed attack is made by a State."). 
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of Article 51 i. niti::1lly incorporated lhe words armed. "attack hy 
nuotlter state," but this wording was later droppedY' 
l?urthcrmorc, the Security Council Resolution 1368, passed in 
response to 9/"11, recognized "tbe inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence .in accordance with the Charter" in the 
context of intemationcll terrorism, and legitimized the United 
Stales' response in Afghunistan.1" Jn a later resolution, the Security 
Council also tldopted measures to combat internCitional terrorism 
under Ch<:iptl'r VII llf the U.N. Charter, and confirmed the view 
tl1at internati0nal terro rism constitutes a threat to inlerni:ltioncll 
pee�ce and security.��� 
But inlenh1t[onll1 1Jw is still primarily formed by, and bRscd 
upon stales, e1nd vvetr is still defined a5 conflict between therlv:!l 
The international legal community has consistently rejected the 
possibility th<t t sl11tcs could use the self-defense exception Lo i nkr­
state use of force fur purely non-state actors. 
In the late 1980s, the U.N. denied that Article 51 could justify 
the use o£ force nr the right of self-defense as a response to terrorist 
attacks such as the bombing of Tripoli and Bengosi (1986) and the 
bombing of the Palestine Liberation Orgonizntion offices in Tunisia 
by Israel (1985 and 1988).22 
J,, Daphne Richemlmd, Tmlt51tlltiunal Tarurisl Organi:ntion:; and tlte Usc uf 
Frrce, 56 CUH. lJ. L. REV. 1001, L007 (2007)� 
19 S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc.S/RES/1368 (Sept. l2, 2001). 
"o Sec S.C. Res. l373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1313 (Sept. 28, 2001) (resolving that ell! 
stales should work tu suppress the funding of terrorism); see o/.o;v Press Release, 
North ;\tlanlic Council, St<llcment by the North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), 
nuoilablc at http:/ jwwW.Ih1to.int/docu/pr/200.1/?01-124e.htm; Lord Robertson, 
Statement by ;\JATO Sc.:crdCiry Genernl, l.ord Robc.:rlson (Oct. ?., 2001), tiPI1ilalJ/c 111 
http:/ jwww.nillP.int/ docu/ speech/2001 /s011 002:1. htm; Organization of 
American Sl<lles JOASJ, Terrorist Threat to the Americas, 0 . .-\.S. Doc. 
RC.24/RES.'I/o-l ,  OEA/scr.F/11.24, 1st plen. sess. (St>pl. 2'1, 2001), aPai/a[l/e tlt 
http:// wwv\'.O<l::.urg/0.'\Spugc/ crisis/RC.2.:1e.htm. 
11 St•e e.g. 2 L. 0111'l>JHEI�i, li\TIRNATIO;\!AI LA\\': A TREr\TlS£ 67 (Ron,,!d r 
Ro>.burgh �:d., 3rd ed. !932) (defining w,H as a "contl.:'nli0n betvveen two or IllL'rl: 
States through th0ir <1rmcd forces"). 
22 GiuliC�n,l Zicc,1rdi C;,p.lldt\ Prc>c1iding 11 Ri:;/11 l�( St'liDcfcnsc ;\�ai11st Lai'�c 
Scrth.! AtftKks by lrrcsular Fvn:e�: Tile l:;rae/i-Tle::bo/la/t Co11jlirt, 48 f-IAIW. INT'L L.J, 
ONLI:-JE 101, 104 (2007) (citing S.C. Res . . QS, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978); 
S.C. Res. 573, U.N. Doc. S/RES/573 (Oct. 4, 1985); S.C. Res. 611, U.N. D0c. 
S/RES/611 (Apr. 25, l 988); G.A. Res. 41/38, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/38 (Nov. 20, 
1986)). 
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Addilionally, in 2004, the International Court of Justice 
(" IC]")2-� indicated thC\t an "mmcd attack" within the meaning of 
Article 51 emanates only from i'l stntc. In its advisory opinion, Leg11l 
Coi!sequenccs of Constntcfic>n of �!Vall in Occupied Pnlestin ian TerritOI�J, 
the lCJ noted that: 'I Article 51 of the Charter thus recognizes the 
existence of an inherent right of self-defence in the case of armed 
attack by one State against anolh�r StJle. However, Israel does not 
claim that the attacks against it are imputa ble to a foreign State."2.J 
For the Fmmers of the U.S. Constitution," war" meant what the 
contemporary international theorists and philosophers meant it to 
bt->.2-" l-h1go l.rntius,. Samuel von Pufendorf, E m mer ich cie VC�ttel, 
Jean Jacques Rousseau, c1nd ]eiln ]cKques Burlamaqui all 
considered war a contest bctwct�n states. Rousseau, a highly 
influential figure on the Fram�rs, wrutc thc1t: 
War is not therefore <1 relcltionship between one man and 
another, but a relationship betvvecn one stale <md another. 
In war private individuals are enemies only jncidenlally: 
not as men or even as citizens, but as soldiers .... [E]ach 
state can have as enemie� only othe1- states and not 
n1en .... 2h 
But perhaps more compelli.ng than parsing international 
precedent and divining original constitutional understanding is a 
corrunon-sense analysis. As Jaw mt.JSt be reciprocal1 if we can wage 
W<lr against no11slate actors located in Lhe te rritory of another state, 
2.' The ICJ is "the principal judicial orge�n of the United Nations." U.N. 
ChMtcr art. 92. [twas estoblished i n 1945 pursu«nt to the U.N. Charter. The Jq 
Statute, ilnne>.ed to the U.N. Charter, provides the organizational frameworlc and 
governinb procedures for cases brought before the ICJ. Statute of tl\e 
International COLlrl of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1062, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, tWailciblc 
at http:/ fwww .icj-cij.org/ dontmt>nls/ indexphp?pl=48p2=2&p3=0. 
24 Legnl Consequences of the Construction ot <:1 W<�ll in Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 139 (July 9) (emphasis added). The 
Court also ndded a second argument to its rebuttill of Israel's pleas. The Court 
noted th,1t the terrorist thre<lt invoked by fsrad originJted v\rithin, and not outside 
its territ(ll'V. lhe situation was tlwrdore fmmd to be different from that 
"contcmpl<1ted by Security Council resolutions 1368 {2001) and 1373 (2001)." /d. 
TI1erd(1re Israel ''could not in any event illvOkl' lho�e rt>c;oluho!ls" 111 support of its 
clc1irn lobe exercising a right of self-defl'nst'. ld . 
.25 51.'1.' Ch.1rl�o1s A. Loigrcn, VVar-1\ (akin:; Under tile Cunstitution: Tlu: Orixilwl 
Undcrst!lluli;tg, 81 YALE LJ. 672, 689-97 (1972) (arguing that European and English 
ideas c111ll philosophers shaped eighteenth century American ideas about "VC'tt). 
1r, ]tA!\1-}ACQUES ROUSSEAU, ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 21-22 (Donald A. Cress 
eel., trans., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1988) (1762). 
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what is to keep Germany from bombing nonstate actors in Mian1.i 
Beach condos? 
To be clear, to say that Article 51 only applies to armed attacks 
by states is not to limit the victirn state from taking mi litary action 
to defend itself. Not at all. Tt just means that if the attacker is 
residing in the territory of another state, Article 51 does not permit 
the United States to invade that state to get at the attacker- even if 
the attacker is a viable, military target. Fonner Secretary of 
HotTleland Security and federal appeals judge, Michael Chertoff, 
argues that a state-based or "narrovv conception of self-defense 
misses the mark."27 "As a practical mwtter," he continues: 
[I]t ignores the increasing dange r posed by nonstate actors, 
particularly in an age when they can obtain weapons of real 
destructive force. Moreover, it leaves n21tions helpless 
when sn attack is threatened by a group that has created a 
haven vvithin another state.28 
But he is confusing ius in bello concerns over whom to target29 
with the ius ad bellum concerns of where to target. He also does not 
appreciate the wealth of internati onal law that a !lows states to 
defend themselves against terrorist havens wherever they may be. 
The rule should be understood as follows: countries can 
invoke the self-defense exception to the general prohibition on the 
use or threat of force to target nonstate actors residing in another 
state, so long as there is evidence that the state was somehow 
involved in the aggressive action. Just as U.S. citizens have the 
right to be secure in their persons and property unless they have 
forfeited that right by breaking the la·w, nations too enjoy security 
from invasion unless they forfeit that right by some aggressive 
inter-state act, either directly, through proxies, or through a 
complete inability to irnpose law and order in their territories. 
Accordingly, the acknovvledgm.ent within Security Council 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 that a state may claim self-defense in 
response to an armed attack by a terrorist organizati0113o should 
27 Michael Chertoff, Tile r�e::;pon::;iWity to Ctmtniil: Protecting Soventi�llf!J under 
lntematiow?l Law, FOREIGN AH., Jan./Feb. 2009, at lB. 
�s !d. 
29 See inji·a Section 3 for a discussion of ius in l;e//u concerns. 
30 Sec S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 19 (" Recogni;:i11g the inherent right of 
individual or collective self-defence in accordance with the Charter."); S.C. Res. 
1373, supra note 20 ("Reaffirming the inherent right of individual or col lective sel f-
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol30/iss4/8
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not be taken too broadly. Rather, we need to interpret the Security 
Council's actions in reference to the aggressive actions by 
Afgb<l n ista n using al Qaeda as their agents. In its 19S6 deci:.;ion, 
Nicnmgua v. United Stntes, the ICJ n o ted that armed a t tacks by non­
state actors could trigger a righ t of self-defense provided th<:1t the 
non-state conduct could be attributed to a st<1tc.:>1 The stand<1rd 
they 21nnounced was one of II effective cnntrol.ll32 Even if a stdte 
does not direct the actors to allt1ck another slate, so long as that u 
state hC\d II dfect i ve control" over the nun-sta lc actors, the vit.:ti m-
sti\te's retaliation i n to the offending state's sovereign terri tor�' was 
j usti f ied . 
rhis st<� Le-nexus standard animated the ICJ's more recent 
decision in Conga u. Uganda as well .  l n  that  c8se, Ugc1 nda had 
L1u nchcLl a l i n1ited strike into the DRC lo get J t a terrorist faction. 
The lCJ found " that the legal und factual circumstances for the 
exercise of a right of self-defence by Uganda ugc:�inst thl:.' DRC 
[Dem.ocratic Republic of the Congo J were not present."33 
Evaluating Uganda's argu rnents that the terrorist a ttacks were 
attributable to the DRC, the Court found that " t here is no 
satisfactory proof of the involvement i n  these i1t tacks, direct or 
indirecl, of the Government of the DRC. The attacks did not 
emanate hom armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on 
behalf of the DRC . " . .  1'34 
The effective control standard is exacting. For a state to 
effectively control a non-stale actor, Nicaragua v. United States 
requires " f ina nc i ng, orgamzmg, trcnmng, supplying and 
equipping . . . the selection of its military or paramil i tary targets, 
and the pl<mning of the whole of its operation."_;,, The 1999 
decision, Prosecutor v. Tndic, loosened the restriction slightly <�nd 
pronounced that acts performed by members of a pclnnni l i tary 
group organized by a foreign stale may be considered "acts of de 
_ti1clo State organs regardless of any specific instruction by tbe 
defenc\' n s  recClt,'l1ized by the Chartt!r t"�f the Unitt:d Nations as rL'it�ro1ted in 
resolution 1 368 (200 L) . . . .  '') . 
·q St'l' i'vlilitary and Parami li�ary Activitit?$ (Niecn. ,._ li.S.). 1986 I .C..J. H. 30-..Jl 
(J lll<e �7) (discussing the internationa 1 conscnsu� on the right of self-defense). 
·� ld. at 65. 
l" Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dent. r�cp. Congo v. 
Ugilnda), 2005 l.C.J, l, 53 (Dec. 19). 
31 ld, 
35 Nicnragtm, 1986 I.C.J. at 64. 
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controlling State concerning the corTu11ission of each of those 
acts.''36 The stc1tc does not huve to issue specific instructions for the 
directiLm of e\·ery indLvidual operation, nor docs i t  have to select 
concrete tC1 rgels, but  the non-state actor must be su bjcr:t to the 
"overall control" n( the forcLgn state.37 
As the ftill ian professor Giuliana Ziccardi Capaldo <1rgues, 
" [Tjhcsc high standards st<md iJl contrast to the 197-± Rc:::Cllution of 
the General Assembly, which required merely 'substantiEd 
involvt'rtlcnt."'' '; f\r�uing for a "less rigid" standard, Capaldo 
observes th<'lt "'  dft:cti ve control' is not easy to ascertain i n  LOncretc 
cases, <IS there i� <1 need for 'dear evidence' of a Stt�te having 
exercised 3udt a clegrec of control 'i11 all fjelds' so i'I S  to justify 
treating n nnn-state <'lctor <ts e1cting on its behalf."\'1 
l ex�'ect that with the U n i t�d Sta tes p laying a leading role, the 
internc1tional community wi l l  come to a less exacting standard; but 
in the meC�ntime, those charged with U.S. policy should gather a l l  
evidence of st.�te complicity before strjking non-state (ICtors in the 
otherwise inviol(lb]e sovereignty of other slates. A n d  as further 
evidence that .i n ternati onal law and military strategy are often 
al igned, there is no requi rement that the evidence be relee1sed prior 
to the strike.�l) 
2.2. Article 51 aud F'undruuentnl State lnn/Jility 
While so much control can amount to state complicity, the 
al most· complete irmbil ity to control can also legitimate strikes into 
a state. Under the Co1}it Cltnnnel case of 1949, states are required to 
"not . . .  ,11low knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to 
the 1·ights ('1f other States."41 A state's toleration of activities of 
armed bands, directed against another country, is unla wfuJ.42 
According lo ,, leading i nternational law theorist, Yoram Dinstein, 
,� Pro..sccut\!i' v. T.1dic, Ca�e No. lT-9-1-1-f\, Judgment, ,I 137 (July 15, lY9Y). 
.. lei. �� 1 20. 
;)( Cdpaldo, �upm nut� 22 at 1 07. 
',1} Jd. 
·•11 Allhc 'llgh, ��wntLlally, o:1ll thal evidence should be relcase�ble. 
H Corfu Ch.1n1it>l (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I .C.J. 4, 7? (Apr. 9). 
�� S,·c S.S. lt1tus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.l.J. (ser. A) No. 9, ,1t �3 (Sept. 7) 
(tvlnor':', j., di--�t:tlling} ("It  is well settled that Cl State is bound to u�c due diligence 
to }'t'l'Vl'nt the LUntmissiun within its dominions of criminJI acts against another 
nJtion or its people."; ::ec also United States Diplotnt�tic and Con�u!ar Staff in 
Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 J.C.]. 3, 31-33, -!4-45 (May 24) (discussing the attack on 
a U.S. Embassv by Iranian militants). 
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a state thdl  "does not fulfill its i n ternational obligations of 
' vigilance/ and fails ' i n  i ts specific duty not to tolt: rc1tc the 
preparation in its territory of actions which are d irected against a 
foreign government or which might endanger f t  the lcl tter's 
security,' assmnes interncllional responsibility for this i n tcrn<1tional 
wrongful act of o.mission." ' 1  
Of course, assuming international responsi bi l ity for an act of  
omission may no t alw,,ys equ<d a n  imputed armed c�ttnck sufficient 
to suspend the offendi ng state's right to territoria l sovereign!!', but 
it  is certe1inly a step a long th.Jl path. for example, think dbOL!l  
Pakistan today (or exJm ple.  When Osama bin Le1den esc,1pt�d intl1 
the vast, largely ungoverned Norlhw�:st Triba l Regions of [)oklst<ln, 
the place was ,,PP<lrcntl!' "so inviting that over the nex.t few �·eurs 
he never s trclyed ((l r."H AcL"ording lo a leading a u thority, t-Jw 
seven tribal agencies that make up the area adjoining the North­
West Frontier Province became the new base of operations for a l  
Qaeda, from which the bomb plots i n  London, Madrid, Bt1 l i ,  
Islamabad, and later Germany cmd Denmark were plAnned.', 
Pakistan's inability to c0ntrol this " terrorism centra1"1o arguably 
opened the door to U.S. measures in self-defense under a Ctl1:fi1 
Chnnnel analysisY parlicu lc�rly in light of the list of affirma tivl! 
stale obligwtions uutlincd in U.N. Security Council Rcsul u tion 
1373:18 
So Michael Chertoff is correct in calling for a responsibilitv 
e1mong states to contain terrorism within their own borders: 
·lJ Yor�A.\1 IJIN�I F.l�, W1\R, ACCIU..SSIUN AND SELF-DEFENCE 20(> (·lt'h l'd .. 
Cambrid�e Univ,�rsitv Pr�ss 2005} (1988) (citing Roberto Ago, Fourt/1 R.rpurt t•ll 
Stntc Resptm:>ihility, f1972j 2 Y B. fnt'l L Comm'n 71t l20, U.:'\. o�n:. 
t\jCNA/264//\d\L I). 
ll AHMED R/\SHIIJ, DESU.i\!'1 INTO CI IA{)!;i 265 (2008). 
�� /d. 
46 /d. 
�7 I n  tC>:;llmunv bdtH� the Se!n,llc Armed Services Committee, Seneldf\' 111 
Defen�e Robert Galt.:� �<1id thnt it w,�s "certainly'' his view that the u.l\;. Ch.iriL'r 
allo;vs a n<1lion the right nt self-defense when a fl1reign govcrnmcr1t l'- L'itlwr 
unublc· or unwilling lo tnkt' t.:clre of ll1ternatlPnul  terrorist activity in!>it..k its 
borders. St'c Pa�d Tighe, Pah:::tllll ltV!mts U.S. illtclli,'?l'IICC to Aid Fight A:.;llill.'! 
Mil i ta11 ts, BLOI)i'vl f;Er.:c, c;,�ptember :2-J., 2008, http://www. bloomberg.com/ .1pps 
/news?pid=20601U9 l &sicl=azV3FI'7XKr2s&refer=indi<L 
� S.C Re5. 1373, �upm r.ute 20, <1mong other things, specifies a series of slate 
responsibilities to prevent the aiding or financing of terrorist activities and the usc 
of state territory as terrorist bases or havens. 
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[ t  is not enough for a group of nations, such as the Security 
Council, to pass resolutions that prohibit states from 
supporting terrorists. Lf states fail to contain transnational 
threats, there rnust be 2n1 international legal regime that 
subjects them to potential sanctions or even, if necessary, 
mil itary i n tervention airncd at neutralizing those threats.-'9 
But vve do not necess<lrily need a " new framework."So Rather, 
-v e need a recognition that this obligation has existed a l l  along. J n 
1884, in a case involving vvhether the U nited States could 
crimi nalize the counterfeiting of foreign currencies, the Supreme 
Court noted that "the l21w of nations requires every nationc11 
government to use 'due diligence' to prevent a wrong being done 
within its o-vvn dominion to another nation w i t h  which it is a t  
peace, or to the people thcreof."51 The Court further noted that: 
[E]very nation has not only the right to require the 
protection, CIS far as possible, of its own credit abroad 
against fraud, bu t the banks and other great commercial 
corporations which have been created within its own 
j u risdiction for the advancement of the public good may 
call on it to see that their interests are not neglected by a 
foreign govermnent to whose dominion they have, i n  the 
lawful prosecution of their business, become to some extent 
subjected.52 
Executive practice on this point is also long-standing. For 
exam.ple, in a situation similar to that of bin Laden and the 
Northwest Tribal Region of Pakistan, President 'vVoodrow Wilson 
au thorized a cavalry expedition into northern 1Vlexico against 
Mexican opposition lee1dcr Francisco "Pancho" Villa who he1d 
attacked the United States. The Mexican governm.ent had l i ttle 
control over the northern part of Mexico and was waging its own 
unsuccessful battle against Villa. The U.S. Secretary of State 
add ressed a note to the Foreign Mi nister of the "de facto" Mexican 
government stating that the " United States Government cannot 
allow marauding bands to establish themselves upon its borders 
with l iberty to invade and plunder Uni ted States territory with 
�9 Chcrtoff, �upm note 27, a t  144. 
50 !d. 
51 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 484 (1887). 
52 !d. at 486. 
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impunity, a n d  then, when �1u rsued , to tc1ke refuge across the R io 
Grande under prolcclion Df the pleo of the integrity of the soi l of 
the Mexiccm Repuul ic."<..� Aflcr much political Cl l ld d ipiLHitcttic 
effort, General " Black ]8ck" Pt�rsh ing was ordered to cross into 
Mexico, b u t  to withdraw tn "American terri tory a s  soon as the de 
facto government in Mexico '"'as ,1ble to relieve [h is troopsj of this 
work periocl."5-t The President essentially justi fied the cross-border 
i n cursion on the principle of sel f-defense,"; but alsL) sought tacit 
consent from the d e  facto 1'-.'le'<ican leader, General Carr<mza,s6 just 
as i t  appears President Ob,1rn,1 is doing with [>at<istan.�' 
Jn the coming decades, the U n i ted SlC1tes will likely tRke a 
leading role in further d u�l ing of( this oblig<1 tion <md fleshing out 
the necessary and propo rtional me21sures victim-states cnn u.se to 
defend themselves when on� nation's inability to keep its own 
house in order threatens tbe territorial i ntegrity and politiccll 
independence of other slates. 
2.3. Article Sl and No Stntt· 
Tf we pul the state nexus analysis on a continuum, we go from 
overt a n d  aggressive state ac t ion (SLlCll as a n  nrmed attack by a 
na tim1' s armed forces), to "effective control'' to the inability to 
control. But at each point on this continuum, the state still exists. 
s.> Amos 5. Hershey, 1/lctJrsions lllto t\llexicn and lite Ovctrinc tl( Hoi Pursuit. 13 
At--1. J. 1:--JT'L L. 557, 561 (i919). 
" 
5-t John J .  Pershing, Report by ;\1[,1jor Gcncml jultll f. Pcrshi11g, Gl/11/llflildiug, of the 
Punitive Expeditiv11 (Colonia Dublan: l ·{eadquarters, Punitive Expedition, 1 916), 3, 
cited in John M. Cyrulik, A Strutl:gk Exnminntion ;.1( thL: Punitive Expedition into 
Mexico, 1916-1917 Qune 6, 2003) (unpt1blished M.A thesis, U.S. Army Con1n1and 
and General Staff College), tl"Uoiltl/Jie ol http;/ /stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/CetTRDoc 
? AD=A4J 6074&l.ocation=LJ2&d, JL=-Getl'l{ Doc. pdi 
55 Though Secret,Hy Lmsing did 11L)t explicitly mcntic'n sel f-defense, he 
stated that the efforts were mee1sun:s uf "lllJt pursuit." )'(JCH(lLA.S M. P0ULA�TZAS, 
THE RIGHT OF HOr PURSUIT i\l \NTF.R�Art0NAL LAW -�-� n.:?:! (2d cd. 2002). American 
commentators of the time c:onsidl'r0d such measures tn bl' an aspt·cl of self­
defense. Sec Rex. J. ZL:dalis, Prvtccliou of N(ltiouul� Al>rilild: 1::. CVII�i!llf tltt' Bn�i:; of 
Legol 0/1/ignlio11?, 25 TF:\. INT'L LL 209, 243 (l99D) (citing J, MOORE, A DrcE..c;-r or 
INTI:RNATIONAL LAW 418-425 (1 9li6)) (cl<�s:oif)'ing the pursuit of mariludcrs under 
the general heCiding of "Plea of Nt<u:s�ary 5clf-Ddense"); Hcr�h�\·, ,:;iipra note 33, 
i'lt SGS ("[T]here is ample prL'cidl!nt for tlw pr<1ctkc �Ji 'h11t pur::.uit' in uur past 
relc1tions with Mtxico.'') . 
.s, Presidml's Aclion;; 1111/0rs<'d i11 Se/1/JIL': L11 Ft�IIL'flc Re�tJ/Iltioll, Appnn>ing Usc of 
1/11' Afill!J in Mexico, Adllplctf, N.Y. T1�1ES, lvlurch Hi, ·t916. 
5i Karen De Young & Joby WCIJTick, Pnkistclll and U.S. Hat>t: rt?dt Deal on 
1\irstrikes, WASH. POST, November 16, 2008, at AI. 
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J f  a state has effective] y ceased Lo exist, however, then it follows 
thc-1t there are no ius ad bel/11111 concerns. 
With the phenomenon of slate failure unlikely to go away, it is 
worth questioning the lega l effects of C1 state that h a s  ceased to be. 
Tht· Restatement (Third) of the Ful-cign Relations Law o f  the 
Uni ted Stc.tes defines a "state" C1S M1 "entity that has a defined 
lcrritnry and a permanent popula tion, under the cnntrbl of its own 
gm crnmJ::>nl, and that engages in, or  hclS the capacity to engage in, 
fnnn<�l relations with other such enli lie�.";,:; 
Given this definition, would SomJiicl, for c�ample, be n st,1te? 
I t  has not had an effective government for a long lime, and the 
Eth iopian withdrawal after two yeJrs of ineffectual clSSislance to 
t.he transitional goveTnment has kicked L)ff yet e1nother scrCi mble 
,1mung warring Islamist factions to take over the country.''� 
Scn1lcl. lia iltself admits to four internal secess ions and cl a ims that 
three-fourths of its 1990 territory has been "gripped by civil war at 
some po1nt u p  until this date."&n 
On the other hand, Somalia is sti l l  listed as a Member o f  the 
Unilcd Nations, <tnd nations around the world have entered into 
formal debates over w hether to recognize Sonwlia, Somaliland, or 
both. ln May 20061 the Transi{iona1 Pllrl iamenl was formed and 
beg;:m to assert itself within Somalia. fn March 2006, the European 
Union resolved to "enhance and broc1den its relations with 
Somalia/"61 while the lnternationcll Mc1ritime Organization 
specifically mentions that  it is " respecting ful ly the sovereignty, 
sovereign rights, jurisdiction and territorial integrity of Somal ia11 
while i t  tries to deal  with the scourge of piracy off its shores.62 
The question of recognition is more a political than a I ega I 
q u estion, and it need n o t  be decided here. Suffice lo say1 however, 
that inteJtT1a tion"l law provides mult iple avenues for a state to 
protect itself which correlate to the multi  pl'2 obligations states have 
= ... Rt.':;TATF.t<•IENT (THIRD) OF FORF.ICN RFLAIIUt\!:> LA\·V OF THL uNITED STATES § 
201 (J 987). 
''' iVIuhamed Ibrahim & jeffrey GettlL'mc�n, 1-:lilivpiou • .:: Withdrmu Jrolll Kc_!f r,,,::c-.. 
N.Y. Tt;...n:s, ]i:ln. 13, 2009, at A6. 
, .. ,, Perrnt:�m!nt Mission of Somnlin to the United N,1tions, Country Fncts, 
ht�p:/ /wvnv2.un.int/public/Somalia/ !/English/ (lost ,•isited Apr. 5, 20()9). 
"I EurOpo.:>.:�n Union @ United Natinns: P.1rtnership in t\ction, EU Council 
C(ll1clusions on Somalia, hllp:j jwww .euwp<H�u-un.org/ artides/ en/ Mticlc 
_38'16_en.htm (l<�st visiied Mar. 5, 2009). 
"l Int'l Maritime Org. [ T MOJ, Pimcy and Ar111erl nobbery Ag11i11st Ships i11 Watt>r� 
Oj/ tlu! Coast ofSolllnlia, al 4, 1MO Doc. A 24/RES/979 (Feb. 6, 2006). 
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to ensure peaceful coexistence with other states. And i.f a state is 
not really a state, yet its nominal territory is being used to threaten 
viable states and i.nten1ational peace and security, then 
international law should preference the rights of the viable state 
over the nonexistent state. 
3. WITHIN AND BEYOND BORDERS: THE [US I N  BELLO 
REQUIREMENTS 
Once the United States is legally i n  a territory, or at war vvith 
another state regardless of the initial legali ty, the questions 
become: (a) \.vhonl can the United States target; and (b) hcw.r must 
the United States treat its captives. These are m01nentous 
questions that w i l l  continue to dominate the jurisprudence of war 
in the cotning decades. But to achieve greater clarity on this 
question and reap the full range of benefits the law affords, we 
must look back to examine the relationship of the actor to a state. 
Despite the assault on the state that terrorists vvage, and despite 
their power to transcend state boundaries to use globalization's 
n1iraclcs against the globe, when it comes to using force against 
terrorists in the legally and strategically appropriate way, their 
relationship to a state is the most important factor. 
3 . 1 .  Targeting nnd Detaining Those TNlw Tnke "Direct Part in 
Hostilities" 
I t  may seem obvious, but the term " enemy con1.batant" is made 
u p  of two word s - "  enemy" and "co.mba tant." Over the past eight 
years, however, many have conflated the two, or focused 
exclusively on the second word, causing so much of the legal and 
strategic confusion in this area. The time has come to take back the 
enemv . .I 
The clear rule should be: a combatant who is also a n  enemy 
can be targeted and detairted as a POW, and an enemy is defined 
as it always has been, as a person connected w i th a state engaged 
in hostilities with the United States. Only once someone is both an 
enem v a n d  a combatant do we then look to see whether he is a n  .I 
unlawfu I enemy combatant. 
To help bring about this empowering clarity, let's say that 
during the first months of the War in Afghanistan, there was a 
fighter known to design, build, and place improvised explosive 
devices on main convoy routes tlu-oughout Kabul at the direction 
of the Taliban. Could the military target him? What about if that 
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same insurgent snuck int0 tht� United States and was planning to 
bom.b the Georgl� VVC1sh 1ngton Bridge between New York 21nd New 
J e-rsey? What if  the fighter was a Canadian bomb specia l ist wjtb no 
direct connection to Afghanistan and was plotting to p l c m t  a bomb 
on the George Wash inglon Bridge? 
The first question we need to answer is: who is  an enemy? 
3 . 7 . 1 .  Qucstion 1 :  Is /w a n  ene/lllf? 
Crilicnl evaluation and application of this legal term, " lhl' 
enemy," will likely receive a suhstanticll  rerwissance in the Cl1111inb 
years. Up until 9/ J l-�  " enemy" has consistently been defined as it 
has been wi th in  thl:' law of nations - as a subject of a n opposing 
state. In jo/Jil50II u. Ei:;entmgcr, for example, Justice Robert jackson 
defined ' 'the enemy" in its "priiT12n·y me21ning" as the "subject of a 
foreign slulc at war with the United Sta tcs."63 During the Civil  
War, iL was defined the same way by Francis Lieber and Abraham 
Lincoln: " [ t]he citizen or na ti ve of a hostile country is thus an 
enemy, as one of the constituents of the hostile state or nation, and 
as such is subjected to the hardships of th e war."64 
There are essen tia l ly lwo kinds of enemy in constitutional lavv, 
the first residen tia l and lhe second directionaL The latter are 
enemies not becclLlSC they reside in. or are citizens of a bell igerent 
state as are the forme r, but because they are working for that state. 
The two landmark Supreme Cmut decisions of Ex Pnrte Quirirzb3 
and Ex Pnrte Milligan6r, d i ffer from each other precisely on the basis 
of this state nexus requirement and state actor distinction. In 
Quirin, the Court granted habeas review, but upheld mili tary 
commission.sr for eight Germ21n saboteurs who landed along the 
East Coast of the United Slates during WWlt stashed their 
''� Johnson \'.  Eis;:-nlrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 n.2 (1950). Writing for the 
mnjorily, Justice jilckson also wrote that " i\merican doctrine as to effect nf war 
upon the Sl<llus l�f liJlkmals of belligerents took permanent shape followinr.; our 
first forCcign w�r. Chancellor Kt..'nt, <�ftL:r considering the leading authorities of his 
time, liCLIMecl lh� bw to be Lhat ' . . .  in war, the subjects of each countr�' were 
enemit.:s to t.:>nch ,..,ther. an.d bound to I'L'g:�rd ,111li treal each oth.e( as such.''' /d. <�t 
771 (f)IIC•tiug G1·is1\'llld v. Waddington, 16 ]0hns. Cas. 438, 480 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1$ 19)). 
M Fr\,\NCf:S LrEHL:R, U.S. WAR DEI''T, J\l11UT.-\1\T GENERAL'S OFPICE, Gl;,\lE!<AL 
OJ<DF.RS Nu. 100, Mt. 2l ( !�63), ili'flilablc at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l9th 
_century / I  ieber.asp [ hereina ftcr Tl1c Lieber C11dcl. 
65 E:t Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
66 Ex Parte tv'lilligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866). 
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uniforms, cHid took steps to sabotage elements within the United 
States.67 
ln Milligan, on the other hand, the Supreme Court struck down 
the legality of the court martial of Lamdin Mi l l igan who had 
communicated with the Confederacy, conspired to seize munitions 
of war, and joined a secret society for the purpose of overthrowing 
the Government of the United Sta tes, because Mi l l igan lacked the 
necessary state affiliation/'s He never joined the Confederacy, was 
never directed by it,  nor did he ever live in the South.69 
Accordingly, the Quirin Court reaffirmed that Mil l igan d i ffered 
from its defendants becwuse Mi l l igan vvas a "non-bell igerent" and 
so " not subject to the law of war."70 The Quirin defendants, on the 
other hand, were directed by the state, while M i l ligan's affi l iation 
lacked this top-dovvn relationship. Thus, even ci tizens who 
associate themselves with the " m il itary ann of the enemy 
government, and witlt its aid, guidance and direction enter this 
country bent on hostile Rcts," are enemy combatants who can be 
detained and tried accord i n glv.7 1 ,  J 
Despite recent attem.pts to broaden the definition of the enemy 
beyond its state nexus,72 the traditional definition will l i kely hold, 
not only because it fits with the original u nderstanding of the 
Constitution, but also because stripping "the enemy" from its state 
moorings causes structural contradiction and erosion in the 
6 7  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 1-2. 
6S See Milligan, 71 U.S. at 6 (discussing Milligan's lack of personal ties to the 
enemy). 
69 Id. at 101-2; ::.ee abo Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 152 (C.C.D. Md. 
1861) (No. 9,487) (holding that Merryman's status as a civilian from Maryland 
precluded the military from exercising judicial authority over him). 
7u Quiri11, 317 U.S. at -15. 
7L Id. at 37-38 (emphasis e1dded) . 
n See, e.g., Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Sec'y of Def., to the 
Sec'y of the lavy 1 (July 7, 200-l), l1i.'<7ilnblr: at http:/ jwww.defenselink.mil/news 
/Jul2004/d20040707review pdf (establishing a Combatant Status Review 
Tribunal); Memorandum for distribution from Scc'y of the Navy 2 (July 29, 2004), 
nvnilable at http:/ j wh'W .ddenselink. mil j news/ J ul2004 j d20040730cOtTtb. pdf 
(regarding the implement<Ltion of the Combatant Status Review Tribunal 
procedures). Both these memorc1nda define the "enemy combatant" as "an 
individual who vvas part of or supporting Taliban or al Qacda forces, or 
associated forces that <1rc engaged in hostilities against the United States or its 
coalition partners. This includes any person who has committed a belligerent act 
or has d irectly supported hostilities in e1id of enemy armed forces." 
Memorandum from Paul Wolfowitz, supra, at 1; Memorandum from Sec'y of the 
Navy, supra, Enclosure (1), at 1. 
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Constitution73 as well  as srrat0gically deleterious decisions.'-! 
While the current Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the 
definition of an enemy in the term " enemy combatant,'' it  w i l l  have 
to eventually, and Hallldi strongly hinls thal it wil l  recogmze the 
dispositive role of the state: 
The habeas petition states only that 'when seized by the 
Un ited Stotes Government, Mr. Hamdi resided in 
Afghanistan.' An assertion that one resided in a country in 
which combat operations <lre taking pl�cc is not a 
concession that one was 'capturfd iJ1 a zone of active 
combat' operations in a foreign thc,lh"r of war, and certainly 
is not a concession that one was 'part of or supporting 
forces hostile to the U n i ted Stales or conli tiun partners' and 
'e.ngC�ged in an armed conflict against the United Stales. '7"' 
Therefore, as a n  Afghani nation.:ll, cnJr first fighter is an e/LeJilYr 
whether he plants the bomb in Afgh<mistan or i n  the United States. 
The Canadian bomb specialist, on the other hand, while a vile 
individual, is not a constitutional enemy since he has no d i rectional 
affiliation with a state engaged in hostili ties with the U.S. 
<;; Set', P.g., Al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, S:.i,.+ F.3d 2.13, 243 (-lth Cir . 2008) (Mot'z, J . ,  
concurring) (;on exp<msive definition of enemy con1batant r.:nders the t�rm 
"utter I y ma Ilea ble" and "presents serious consti tu tionnl conc�rns'') PllCil ted, 77 
U.S.L W. 3-1.99 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
:;• For example, former Bush Administration dden-"L' official, Matthew 
Waxman, using the GuantRnamo Bny detention t.1Cility as <1n e>. amplc, writes that 
the "widespread perceptiOt) that it exists simply to h..el'p detainees furever bcyund 
the n'aLh of the law'' is "a clrng on Arnerice1's . . .  global counterterrorism efiorts," 
hampcrtng "cooperation with our friend:. un such cri tic.1 l counterterrorism tasks 
as information sharing, joint military operations and luw enforcement." ' ' I  know," 
he continues, "As a State Department oth:i.:- d, I often spent V<J luable time ;:�nd 
diplomntic capital fruitlessly de-fending ��ur detention practices rdther than 
fcl::;tering counterterrorism tt:;amwork_" M.:�tlbew Wa:-.man, The S111nrt ltVay to 5/wt 
Git111n IJOWII, WASH. POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at l34. 
7'i Hr1tncli v. Rumsfdd, 542 U.S . .507, 526-27 (2004) (emphasis in original) 
(citations omitted). While justice O'Connor· stated that the Majority w::ts speaking 
"narrowly" on the definition of em enemy combatRnt in this decision, there is 
nothing i;1 constitutional 1-tistory or practice to indicate that i t  could be ex11anded 
to no longer require a state affiliation. Td. at 510. 
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3 . 1 .2 .  Question 2: Is lzc a co111batont? 
Anyone residing in the enemy stabe can be an  enemy, even a 
baby.7<> But enemies cannot be targeted u n less they are also 
combatants. 
Enemies have traditionally been subject to restrictions on 
commercial and legal rights, 77 but  they are general ly protected 
fron1 targetingJS They lose that protection i f  they take up arrns in 
the conflict. Article 51(3) of Additional Protocol I to the Genev<:l 
Com·en tions states that, "Civilians sha 11 enjoy the protection 
afforded bv this Section, u nless and for such time as thev take a � J 
direct part in  hostilities."7':i I n  other words, by taking a d i rect part 
in  hostilit ies, enemies become enemy combatants eligible for 
targeting Upon capture, however, onlly those enemy combatants 
with a top-dovvn connection to a bel l igerent state can 
constitutionally be POWs. 
To return to our hypothetical Afghani fighter, since he is taking 
a "  d i rect part in hostili ties" on behalf of the Taliban, he is an enemy 
76 See. e.g., The Prize Ce1ses, 67 U.S. 635, 687 (1862) (Nelson, J., dissenting) 
("The legal consequences resulting from <1 ste1te of war between two countries at 
this day are well understood, and will be found described in every approved 
work on the subject of internatione1! law. The people of the two countries become 
immediCitely the enemies of each other . . . .  ") .  See nl::o Le1mar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 
187, 194 (1875) ("In war, e1ll residents of enemy country are enemies."). 
77 See, e.g., The Rapid, 12 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1814) ("'n the state of war, nation 
is known to ne1tion only by their armed exterior; each threatening the other with 
conquest or annihilation. The individuals who compose the belligerent states, 
exist, as to e(lch other, in a ste1te of utter occlusion. Jf thev meet, it is onlv in 
combat."); �ce also 77te Prize Cases, 67 U.S. at 674 (depriving neutral ships in a 
Confederate port of their property rights on a·ccount of their e1ifiliation with a 
belligerent nation); je1ckson v. Decker, n Johns. 4J 8 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 181-l) (barring 
an e1lien enemy, residing in the enemy's country, from maintaining an action of 
ejectment for lands during war); Bell v. Chapman, 10 Johns. 183 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1813) (discussing the suspension of an alien enemy's right of action during w<�r). 
71( For internatione1l armed conflicts, :;ee Protocol Additional to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Arn1ed Conflicts art. 51(1)-(2), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 31 
(hereinafter Protocol 1). For non-international armed conflict, ::.ce Additione1l 
Protocol II to the Cenev<l Conventions of August 12 19,19, Re!nting to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-Jntern<1tional Armed Conflicts art. 13{2), ]] 23 
U.N.T.S. 609. While a number of states, including the U.S. C1rc not parties to the 
Additional Protocol, this aspect of the princi.ple of distinction is customan· 
intern<ttione1l law, binding on all. See CUSTOMM�Y INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARI:\� 
LAW 19-24 Oean-l\tfarie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, eds., Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2005). 
i9 See Protocol !, suprn note 78, art. 51 (3). 
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combata nt el igi ble for targeting as weJl c1s for indefinite de tention .�o 
The fran1ers of the Geneva Conventtons adopted the following 
understanding of the phrase " d irect part in hoslilities/' which the 
President has found indistinguishable from the d i rect participt�t ion 
standard under the law of war..31 l l  means " immediate and aclual 
action on the battlefield l ikely lo cause harm to the enen\V because 
there is a d irect causa I rela tionship bet"veen the activity engaged in 
and the l1c:nn1 done to the enemy.".'\:! l t  does not mean ''indirect 
participation in hostilities, such as ga theri ng a nd t ransm i tt ing 
military information, transporting weapons, m u n i tions, or other 
suppl ies, or forward deploymcnt l/1{\ 
Of course, the d i fficulties l ie  in the specifics. How do you 
define "hostilities,'' ;,direct part," and "fur such time"? A seTies of 
Expert Meetings co-organized by the international Conunittee of 
the Red CToss ("l CRC'') and the l'MC Asser Institute sought to 
clarify these terms as the import<ntec of them he1s increased 
drama tical ly with the growing involvement of civilians i n  
hostilities. While they have generated very detailed reports,�" n o  
U.S. court has yet defined Article 51 (3), o r  sought to expand upon 
the understanding hom the Protocols. 
tlo ld. arts. 4-5. Se�: also Prosecutor v. Akavesu, Case No. JCTR-96-4-T, 
Judgment, � 629 (Sept. 1, 1998) (concluding that there .is no difference in practice 
between "direct" <lnd "clctive" involvement in hostilities), tWIIi/tlble t7t 
hltp:/ /69.94.11.53/ ENCUSH/cases/ Akayesu/judgementj akay001 .htm; The 
I Tosle�ges Trial (Trial of Wilhelm·List and Others), U.S. Military Trib., Nmemberg 
July R, 1947-Feb. 19, 19-!S, rcprintt'it in 8 United Nations War Crimes Commission, 
Lnw Reports of Trials of Wor Crimin<:lls 34, 58 (1 949) ("We think the rule is 
established that a civilian who aids, ilbets, ()r pt11tir.ip<l tes in the fighting is liable to 
punishment as a war criminal under the laws of war."). \Nhile the United States 
has not ratified Protocol 1, il has formaUv endorsed this definition of a 
permissibly-targeted ci\'iliMl in signing (in 2000) and ri'ltirying (in 2002) the 
Optional Protocol to lhc Convention on lh� Hights of the Child on lhe 
Involvement of Children in  Armed Conflict Protocols to th� Cnnventions on the 
Rights of the child, May 25, 2000, S. Treaty Due No. 106-37, 39 (accession by 




:;..t Tnternalionnl Committee of the Red Cross, First through Third Exp12rt 
Meetings, on Lhe Notion of Direct Pm-ticip<�tion in Hostilities, Summary 
Reports, 2005, htlp:j/ www.icrc.org/Web/cng/siteengO nsfjhtmlj participal1on 
-hostilities-ih.l-311205 
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The Isra e l i  Su preme Court, however, i n  C\ highJy renowned 
decision1 has explai ned its view of " d i rcct pnrt in hostilities."s5 
Judge B<'1rC1k concluded that the class of civilians taking a direct 
pe1rt i n  the hostilities includes those bearing arms (open ly or 
conccaJed) on their way to or frrm the pl,1ce where they use them 
against the enemy.sr, He also l ists oul the harder cases, incl udi ng: 
(.:�) persons col lecting inte l l igence about the enen1y arrny; (b) 
pl�r.sons transporting unlawful combatants to or from the place of 
combat; (c) persons who, wherever they are locnted , operdtc 
wel1pons to be used by lhe unlmvful con1batants, or supervise such 
opera tion, or provide service tL) them; (d) civil ians d riving trucks 
·w ith (lJlliTIUnHion to the place of com bat; (e) civ i l i ans del iber<�tcly 
serving as a human shield to terrorists; (f) persons w h o  enlisl 
unlawful comba t21n ts or send them t<> commit  hostil i ties and (g) 
civi l ians who decide upon or pl.:tn Cl rmcd hostili ties.o7 
On the other hand, the class of civ i lians Judge Barak d i d  not 
consider as havtng taken direct pe1rt in the hostil i ties included: (a) a 
civil ian who " genera l ly sup�1orls the hosti l i ties against the army;" 
(b) persons who aid the un Jaw fu l combatants by general strategic 
<ma lysis; as well as (c) those who give them general logistical or 
monetury support; or (d) those distribu ting propaganda for the 
Lmlawfut combatan ts.�ii 
This survey of the lsr3eli opinion of " d irect part  i n  hoslil i ties" 
serves as a usefu l starting point for what Article 51(3) could meC�n 
i n  practice for the U.S. In fact, the tluec-judge panel of the Fourth 
Circuit i11 Al-Mnrri v. Wrig/zf:i'-1 has brietly alluded to this standard, 
a l though i t  did not define the standard. The panel indicated that 
no Su p reme Court precedent or fourlh Circuit op i n ion endorses 
the view that "for such ti me as they take a direct part i n  
hosti l i t ies," participants i n  non-international armed conflicts may, 
<IS <.1 mC\tter of customary internationcll  lnw, be placed in the formal 
lega l cC1 tcgory of "enemy combat<1nt.""OWe should expect, and 
&> See HC] 769/02 Pub. Comm. againc;t Torture in Israel v. lsrael [20061. �� 30, 
http:/ j t.'!.vwnl .court.gov. il/ f\les_�nb/0'2/ 690/007 I a3-!/02007690.a34. pdf. 
Sl• /d. ,j 34. 
ll7 M �1 35. 
,<$ ltl. •1 3-l-35; S<'C a/:;a id. �·r :'.9--10 (Bu�·ak, J.) (defining the "for such time·· 
dt>mcnl) 
�" AI-Mcuri v. W1ight, 487 f.3d 160, 183 (4th Cir. 2007), vacated en bane suL1 
JIVIIL, AI-Marri v. Pt1cciare1li, 534 F.3d 213 (4th Cir. 2008), vacated sub nom, Al-Man·i 
v. Spagone, 77 U.S.L.W. 3499 (Mar. 6, 2009). 
"11 ld. a t  185 n.l3. 
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bope for1 much tTlOre clari fication in the coming vc"1rs, especia lly as 
cases like AI-Morri move lo civilian, cri minal  courtsl)1 and h igher 
echelon m i l i ta ry commanders and civi l ian leadership p l a n  futltre 
cngagernents and provide rules of engagcrnent to future forces on 
the ground. 
3 . 1 .3. Questio11 3: Is he a lawful or UJ! lrm�jitl collll1aftliJ.t? 
So to ttlke stock o f  where we are, enemies, properly identified 
dS subjects C1f i'l foreign state at war •di th tbl.' U.S., who take a 
"direct pdrt in hosti l i ties," are legiLimc�te tar�cts of attack. If th<"'t 
nffiliation is d irectional, l1S it was in Quirin, these i n d ividuclls are 
state actors and can be cl<1ssified as either lavvful or u n l c1w£ul 
enemy cornbat,lnls depending on lht.'ir Jctions. If the state is not 
d i recting their Clctions, these enemy individuals mC\y be ta rgeted 
for such time as they are taking direct part i n  hosti l ities . If 
c<�pturecl, however, t hey cannot be constitution<\lly h·eated as 
P0\1\Ts becclUse they are non-state actors. 
Therefore, a noD-uniformed, non-state actor who selts a n  JED o n  
an Afghan i  road loses h i s  protected status a n d  becomes a 
combata_nt wt10 can be targeted, e1t lee�st while he is i n  the process 
of setting the explosive.n Because of l1is p resence in tlw territory of 
the enem.y (i.e., Afgha nistan), he is also an enemy combatant. His 
unlawful bell igerency (i.e., fight ing without a un iform, etc.) strips 
him of protected status u pon capture, and subjects h i m  to either: 
(a) trial for his criminal actions against li.S. person nel ; or (b) trial 
for espionage/ sabotage. 
lf this non-uniformed individual is actua J iy acting on behalf of 
a state and planting bombs either in Afghanistan or in the United 
States; the United Slates nlso has the option of deta ining him as a 
POWLI' and/ or h·ying him via mili ta ry commis.sion _��" 
91 5L'C David Johnston and Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Will Cit'c Qaeda Suspect rl 
Ciuilirw Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2009, at A'!. 
'12 1\:::. d iscussed aboYe, the "for such tlrne as'' element is ,dsn d iffkul l t·l• 
dt>fin12. The ICRC Third Expert Meeting discuSst!cl fnur nwill appro<IChes tt' 
targeting civiliLlnS for �tiLh time as Lhey d irectly parti..:ipate in ho!;tili ties: ('I) the 
specific acts <�pproach; (2) th12 uffirmativc discn�<�gemenr ,1pproe1ch; (3) the 
membership approach; and H) the l im ited memt'>ership Clpproach. Sec supm note 
S..J.. 
y; As the Court i n  Hnmdi expbincd, the purpose of detention is not 
punishment, but merely to prevenl captured indivtduals from retLtrning tv the 
field of battle <md taking up arms once again. I famd i  v. Rumsfelcl, 542 U.S. 507, 
518 (2004). 
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If, on the other hand, the individual only affili21ted hililsc�f with 
a foreign state, or a cause, but was not acting at the d irection of a 
nation engaged in hostilities with the U.S., and he set a n  IED in  the 
United States, upon capture he would be a civilian, non-state actor 
like Milligan (i.e., a non-enemy). Similarly, if an American, with a 
U.S. passport, unlavvful ly killed someone in France, he would be 
subject to French don1estic laws, with no combatant imrnunity, and 
France would have no legitimate recourse against the United States 
�.-vithin the laws of war. The exact same an21lysis would hold if the 
American had killed 3,000 P21risians. 
3.2. Targeting and Detaining Other Non-State Actors: Piracy aud 
Piratical Terroris111 
There are additional, well-defined, and age-old categories of 
non-state actors who can be targeted, even without the presence of 
fon11a l  hostilities. 
If terrorists commit violent acts on the high seas or otherwise 
outside the jurisdiction of any state, they are effectively pirates95 
9� Of course, i f  the United States does choose to detain him until the end of 
the conflict or try him vi<� military commission, the United States rnust also 
recognize th<�t under the Geneva Conventions, the questioning of prisoners of war 
is limited. According to the Third Geneva Convention, "Every prisoner of war, 
when questioned on the subject, is bound to give only his surname, first names 
and rank, date of birth, and arn1y, regimental, personal or serial number, or failing 
this, equivalent information." See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment 
of Prisoners of War art. 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135. 
Furthermore, "[n]o physical or mental torture, nor any other form of coercion, 
may be inflicted on prisoners of war to secure from them inform<�tion of any kind 
whntev�r. Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may 110l be tlir�atE::!!led, 
insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any kind." ld. 
If the United States values detailed interrogation over non-judicial detention, the 
United States may prefer prosecuting the individual for espionage or for criminal 
actions such as attempted murder. Plea deals can be made in exchange for 
ongoing cooperation, and even if the suspect invokes a l<�wyer during initinl 
questioning, the interrogation can still continue so long as the Government 
understands that it will likely not be <�ble to use the information derived against 
the suspect. 
Y5 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 
1982, ·1.833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS] (defining piracy, in part, as "any 
ilkgal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, commi tted for 
private ends by the crew or the p<�ssengers of a private ship or a pri\'a te aircraft, 
and directed: (i) on the high seas, <1gainst another ship or aircraft, or ag<�inst 
persons or property on bo<�rd such ship or aircraft; or (ii) against a ship, aircraft. 
persons or property in " place outside the jurisdiction of any State"). While the 
United States has not yet ratified UNCLOS, these provisions are considered 
customary international law. Moreover, the United States is a party to the Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas; Article 19 of the Convention has an identical 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
1310 LL Pt1. ]. l n t 'l L. [Vol .  30:-.1: 
whom m i  lil.uies can engage.% What is so often overlooked - a nd 
should no longer be- is the overlap betv"·een pirates and certain 
terror.ists. While the Comrnenlnry to the 1958 High Seas 
Conventions, which also defined pir<1cy, reports lhC1t  acts 
commi tted outside the ju risdiction of any state were "chiefly" 
meant to include e:Kts committed by Cl ship or aircraft on n n  island 
constituting term nullius or on the shores of an unoccupied 
lcrritory,•J;- the principle logically applies to failed st8tes or 
un�overncd territories. The international commm1ity should not 
hcl\:e to •;it impotently by wh.ile violent acts against countries 
emanatl' from criminaLly lawless locales. 
B u t  t.:h:-spite the logic of this precept, many h<wc a rgued that  
pi r<KY cannot equal terrorism. fhey argue thal politicnlly 
lliOLivatL::d E\CtS cl l'C technical ly immune from the Law tJf the Sea's 
pirClcy provision because piracy must be ''for private etlds.'19·" They 
c1ssume tbat " for private ends" means tha t a polit iGtl motive 
transforms a pjrate into scn11e other being. That view is be1sed on 
an incorrect reading of the relevant laws and history:)•J While the 
prO\'lSIOil. Geneva Convention on th� High Seas .lrt. 19, Apr. 29, 1 958, 13 v.s:t . 
2312, 4.50 U. N.T.S. 81. 
"f' See Geneva Convention on the High Seas, �trpm note 95, art. H: "f\ I I  States 
shall (llOpt!rate to Lhe fullest possibk extent in the repr�ession of piracy on the high 
seas or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State." See al�a id., art. l9: 
"On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction or any State, every 
Stale mc1y seize a pirate ship or aircrofl, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and 
under the control of pirates, and ::trrest the persons and seize the property on 
board." 
'1' U.N. International Law Commission, 1\cpor/ t�{ t/11.: illtt:mnlionol Lnw 
CtHttmi�sio;t fu tirl' Gencrnl J\�:;cntlJ!y, 2 U.N. G/\OR Su pp. (No. 9), U.l\.'. Doc. t\/3l5lJ 
(J I · ·tt>•· ) · ·  
. · ·f . 119-6] " Y B  I '1 L C ' "-.., ?�? U· 'l D -u y -i, .  >b , ILJJrlllht 111 t· J _ . . nt . omm n _:J,), _:::;_, .L... . 01.:. 
A/CNA/SER.A/ l956/ Add.L 
\!X Set', e.s., Tina Gclrm(ln, II!IL'nwlivnal Lac£' of t:rc Sm: Ri!WIIciliiiS the l . .  ,m• 4 
PinTL�/ and Tl!t'I'PI'!:'III i11 t!Ic Wake of Scph:m/1er 1 '11 1, 17 TUL. Mi\1<. L. I. 257 (2002) 
(onal.vt.:in):; disp,wate tret\tment uf pirtiC\' <md terrorism under the l,1w of the se<1); 
sec a/:;p Erik Barrios, Ca!'-ti11� 11 Wider N!!f: /\.ddn:ssillg /Jw l\tlnrifi111e Pirnry Pn1/)h'/11 in 
Sv:r th,:ast 1\sia, 28 B.C. ]NT'L & Cot-.IP. L. REV. 149, 156 (stating that <;ince UNCLOS 
''excludes attacks liltll are politically motivated,'' maritime crimes "commit ted by 
region,1 1  dissidents, including kidnapping:; of crew men to put pressure 011 
regional governments nnd environmental att,1cks involving hijad,ed l'il tonkers, 
;ue nnt pun i:;hable as piracy under UNC LOS."). 
'''� Simi lrtrly, there is no two-ship requir�menl eith�r. The rapporteur for the 
lnternatiLnMl Law Commission cited Oppenheim for the "consensus Clf the legal 
opinion" that mutineers, for exJmple, become pirates "when the revolt is directed, 
not n1erely «gainst the master, but also against the vessel, for the purpose oi 
converting her and her good;� to their own use u Sww11ary Records of 1/Je 290t/I 
Mecti11g, f1955] 1 Y.B. fnl'l L. Cornm'n 37, 42, U.N. Doc A/CN A/SER.A/ 1955 
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Law of the Sea Convention does not address political activ ity or 
define "for private ends/' the history of p iracy, the motives behind 
the establishn1ent of universal jurisdiction, and judicial precedent 
a l l  demonstrate that a oirate cannot maraud withou t imou n i tv l l -
merely by adopting a political cause_ ,oo 
The true meaning of " for private ends" turns on the connection 
of the ind ividua l  to the state_ Those who act for publ ic  ends are 
state actors, "priva teers," vvho fall with i n the laws of war. Those 
who act "vith private ends arc non-state actors, "pirates," vvho do 
not fall wi thin the la-vvs g(werning host i l ities between states Wt  
According to one of the earli est Supreme Court decisions: 
" Whence is it that  pi rates have not the rights of war? Is  i t  not 
because they e1ct w i thout <� uthority and comm.issio.n from their 
sovereign?" 102 According to the Lieber Code, p irates and nonstate 
combatants are therefore close cou sins: 
Men, or squads of men, who commi t hostilities, whether by 
fighting, or in roads for destruction or plunder, or by raids 
of any kind, without conuni::;sion, without bei ng part and 
portion of the organ ized hostile army, a.nd without sharing 
continuously in the war, but vvho do so with i ntermi tting 
returns to their homes and avocations, or with the 
occasional assumption of the semblance of peaceful 
pursuits, divesting then1selves of the character or 
appearance of soldiers- such men, or squads of men, are 
not public enemies, and, therefore, if captured, are not 
entitled to the privi leges of prisoners of war, but slwll be 
treated sumnwrily as liigflwny robbers or pirates. 103 
(citing 1 L OPPENHEIM, INTEI�NATIO\lt\L LAW: A TREATISE 437 (Ronald F Roxburgh 
ed. 2005)). At no point did he require thnt the mutiny someho11v involve a second 
ship to transform it int0 piracy. 
1DO For a rnorc detailed discussion of this issue, as well as the issue involving 
the so-called two-ship requirement, :;cc :VIichael Be1har, Attaining Opti111nl 
Deterre11ce at Sea: A Legt?! tli!d Strategic TIIC:ory of Nm:o! Allti-Pimcy Opcrntious, 40 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. ·1, 26-39 (2007). 
ll11 See, e.g., Michael H. Passm<:m, Protections Af orded to Captured Pirates unda 
the Law ofWnr mtd Intemationol Law, 33 TuL. MAR. Lj. 1 (2008) (discussing possible 
protections for captured pirntes as non-state actors). 
102 Miller v. Ship Resolution, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 1, 4 (1781). 
103 The Lieber Code, supra note 64, art. 82 (emphasis added). 
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Because pirate::; arc targeted by m il i tary assets, but Clre then 
prosecuted by civilian courts ,lO-I piracy provides powerfu l stra tegic 
lessons as well. I t  proves that warfighting and policing can coexist 
to combat great threats. 
So, frcHn <l ius ilL /Jdlo perspective, U.S. efforts to repress non­
statc-c�ffiliated Cll Qaeda mern.bers in SomaliaW5 could be 
permissible since those members' violent actions, llc\ving been 
arguably comn1itted 01.1tside the jurisdktion of <my state, lll<) could 
be con!"idered piracy in much the same way as P<mcho Vilis's 
actions could h<lVE.' been considered piratica l in Presi den i Wilson's 
time. 
3.3. Targeting tiiJtf Ocillillillg Other Non-State Actor�: lndiuidual or 
Unil jt!lf-Oty�n�c 
Fina lly, jusl as in any domestic le�w enforcement con text or 
standard militnry opert�tion, i t  is always worth remem bering that 
non-sti:lte actors can be fired upon in individual or u n i t  self­
clcfense,tn7 ThLtS, if the FBl were lo raid t� suspected al QaedZJ safe­
house in Nevv York Ci ty, it �would have to attempl an arrest first, i f  
those Jl  Qaeda suspects were not act ing at the clin:!ction of a 
belligerent �tale, unless the al Qaeda suspects were tak 1ing a direct 
part in hostilities al lhe time.HJH Addi tionally, if in the course of the 
1114 See. e.g., UNCLOS, �upm note 95, art. 105: 
On the hi�h Se<lS, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of <my 
State, every 5t::-�te may seize a pi rate ship or aircraft, or i1 ship or ai rcraft 
taken b)' piracy i.Hid und�r the control of pirates, and <�rrcst tbl:! persons 
and seiL.c the pmperty on board. The courts of the St,1te which cnrtied 
L1U t  llw seiz.urc may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, , nd may 
also d etermine the action tL) be taken with regard to the ships, aircr,1ft or 
property, �ubject to the rights of third parties <Kting in good f,litl!t. 
111' Sn·, e.�., Jeffrey Cettleman & Eric Schmitt, US Fort·es r!rl' Missiles iulo 
So111nlia at 11 Kcuyan, N,Y. Tii\tES, Mar. 8, :zoos, at /\9 (reporting that, i1t1 March 2008, 
the United Slt�tes :;truck Stispected al Qaeda targets within Sorn;.;lie�). 
w�o Set' �upm s�ction 2.3. 
Jill Se(·, cs., Ch::-�irman of the joint Chiefs of Staff, Instrucl'imr 3127 .0 1 A. 
Slam/ins Rules t{ Enxasemt•nt Fur US ForCL'S, 1\-5 (Jan. 2000) (Actions in sdf-defense 
may be taker\ in n:>sponst' to d ''hosti le action" or "hostile intent." Hostile action is 
defined a::; ,1n "�,uacl< or other usc of furce" .and hosti le intent is defined as a 
" thre.1l ni imnl in�:nt use of rnrce"). 
lll·' Sec, e.g., McCann v. United Kingdom, 324 Eur. Ct. H.R. (s�:r, A) (1995). In 
that cc1se, English agents shot to death three IRA terrorists fron1 Northern lrel<md 
in Gibraltar. The European Cou rt nf Human Rights determined thai: Enghmd had 
i llegally impinged upon their right lo l ife under article 2 of the European 
Convention on Hum<1n Rights. The court wrote that "the use of lethal force 
• 
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arrest, the suspects committed a hostile act or exhibited an intent to 
do so, the FBI would be entitled to open fire in self-defense. Upon 
capture, however, l ike pirates and other violent non-state actors, 
the al-Qaeda s uspects would be subject to criminal laws and 
procedures. 
4. CONCLUSION 
By clari fyi 11g i. n ternational cmd constitutional law and revealing 
the pivotal role of the state, the Un i ted Sta tes will  find itself with a 
powerful arsenal to combat terrorism. 
Of cou rse, power through clarity will  never resu l t in absol ute 
perfection. There wil l  be frustrating i rnpediments on the tactical 
level and civil ian rules of criminal procedure will indeed dema nd 
more from officials than do war-paradigm procedures. But  as the 
saying goes, we should not let the perfect be the enemy of the 
good, especially as the legacy born of the first two weeks after 9 I 11 
has proven far worse than the centuries-old, time-tested construct. 
Addi tionally, through domestic legislation we can ameliorate 
some of the difficulties in countering twenty-first cen tury terrorists 
who do not qualify for POW treatmen t. Rules of criminal 
proced ure are designed to protect the underlying constitutional 
rights. They are prophylactic measures which can be modified. As 
the Court recently explained in reference to warrant require1nents 
for domestic surveil lance: 
Given these potential disti.nctions between Title III criminal 
surveillances and those involving the domestic security, 
Congress may wish to consider protective standards for the 
latter which differ from those already prescribed for 
specified crimes in Title I l L  Different standards may be 
compa ti b le with the Fourth Amendment i.f they are 
reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of 
Government for intel l igence infonnation and the protected 
rights of our citizens. For the warrant appl ication may vary 
according to the governmental i nterest to be enforced and 
the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.1 09 
would be rendered disproportionate if the authorities failed, whether deliberately 
or through lack of proper care, to take steps which would have avoided the 
deprivation of life of the suspects without putting the lives of others at risk." fd. 
109 United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 322-23 (1972). 
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There is no doubt that prosecuting terrorists can prove rnore 
difficult than prosecuting normnl crim inr ds . Issues of evicle11Ce 
collection, classified information, and c a l l ing witnesses from lhe 
battlefield are da unti ng. B u t  they are far from insuxmountable. 
fnstead of l Llking on the whole systen1, it is far better to make 
tailored adjustrncnts wherever possible, cllh.i to renljze that clarity 
and restraint c 1re stTC'l tegic goods themsel ves. 
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